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THE RIGHT OF MARRIED WOMEN
TO ASSERT THEIR OWN SURNAMES
Roslyn Goodman Daum*
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash-tis something, nothing,
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands-
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.
Othello1
In 1879, Lucy Stone was denied the right to vote in her maiden
name despite the fact that she had used it exclusively since her
marriage in 1855.2 Nearly a century later, Gail Dunfey, an in-
cumbent councilwoman of Lowell, Massachusetts, lost her bid for
reelection ostensibly because of her insistence on using her
birth-given name after marriage.3 The controversy over a married
woman's right to use her own surname is one of long standing,
and one which portends increasingly significant societal con-
sequences.
The focus of the problem has shifted to the totality of a wom-
an's societal role. The difficulties that women have faced in their
name choices have traditionally stemmed from the dual role of the
* Member of the Massachusetts Bar. A.B., 1971, Radcliffe; J.D., 1974, Harvard.
The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable advice and assistance provided by
Assistant Professor Diane T. Lund of the Harvard Law School.
'W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, Act Ill. Scene 3.
2 See MacDougall, Married Women's Common Law Right to Their Own Surnames, I
WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 2 (Fall/Winter, 1972/1973), for a concise analysis of the maiden
name controversy and a good summary of its history.
3 Negri, How an Election was Lost in Lowell, Boston Evening Globe, November 9,
1973, at 3, col. 1.
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female professional. 4  Today, the problem of the profes-
sional/social dichotomy remains far from meaningful resolution. 5
The flowering of the women's movement, however, has raised a
different question. The movement has focused not on the identity
problem of the woman who uses more than one name, but on
the right of married women to retain their birth-given names for
all purposes. Three arguments support the recognition of such a
right: first, a woman has the right to use her maiden name after
marriage without court interference; second, a woman's name
does not change at marriage by operation of law, but rather by
custom; and, third, the right to retain a surname should not be
impeded by administrative or bureaucratic procedures.
Choice of name may, at first glance, appear to be little more
4 For example, etiquette books have counseled that while professional women can use
their maiden names for career purposes, it would be socially unacceptable to use anything
but their husbands' surnames in nonprofessional circumstances. See A. VANDERBILT,
AMY VANDERBILT'S ETIQUETTE, 324-25, 544-45 (rev. ed. 1972).
Of more consequence were the situations where women were effectively precluded from
asserting their surnames by the imposition of indirect administrative pressures. A typical
case is that of In Re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). in which a musician
well-known in performing circles by her birth-given name was denied the right to receive
her naturalization certificate in that name. The right was denied in the face of an inevitable
pecuniary loss, and despite Ms. Kayaloffs use of her husband's name privately. See
Carlsson, Surnames of Married Women and Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. 552, 557
(1971).
5 See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 63:
To the Editor:
Lois Gould's etiquette query as to how to introduce Dr. Joyce Brothers in
the evening fails to convey the reality of the hazards for professional women
in having a series of different names. I know. I trained and published using
my first husband's name, received a Ph.D. and practiced and published after
resuming my maiden name, married again, retained my maiden name profes-
sionally, and finally gave up and took my present husband's name. The
experience has been chaotic, funny, maddening, and occasionally insulting.
For instance, when I was Dr. Linda Weingarten and also Mrs. Philip
Scheffler, I received a Christmas greeting from the president of the college at
which I worked. It was addressed to "Dr. and Mrs. Philip Weingarten."
After all, etiquette could not have permitted "Dr. and Mrs. Linda Weingar-
ten", nor would it have been correct.
When the confusion of the two names got too much I capitulated partially
and informed the personnel office I would be known as Dr. Linda Weingar-
ten-Scheffier. After two weeks in which introducing myself seemed to take
longer than subsequent conversations, I wasn't even insulted when personnel
admitted the name change had never been processed. When I told her my
married name was now "it," the lady replied "Oh, we knew you'd come
around."
A more serious hazard lurks in summarizing one's publications in resumes
or in later publications. Unfortunately, several of my own works seem to
have been written by two other people.
Oh, the confusion of it all! It tempts one to give in to the computer age and
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than a symbolic issue that concerns only a few vocal women. But
a name is a symbol of status. For many women, a requirement to
use their husbands' names is a shackle which symbolizes own-
ership and dependence.
Furthermore, a state which requires wives but not husbands to
adopt a surname other than that given at birth may be violating
the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment,6 and
the spirit of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. 7 In addition,
the legal justification for a mandatory surname change procedure
can not withstand close scrutiny or comparison with widespread
contrary practice. 8
This article, then, will attempt to frame the issues involved in
the name change controversy and to suggest not only ways to
implement reforms, but also the consequences attending these
measures. Massachusetts has been chosen as the setting for an
in-depth analysis of each problem, and examples of legislative,
judicial, and administrative action in that state will be interspersed
throughout. The results of the efforts in Massachusetts may be
politically and legally instructive for people with similar interests
in other jurisdictions.
I. THE LAW OF NAME CHANGE
A. Evolution of the Common Law Right
Surnames were virtually unknown in England before the tenth
century, and at least a hundred years passed before such names
were commonly employed. 9 The existence of a last name signified
little more than an identifying characteristic of a particular person;
it could be assumed or rejected by his or her descendants at will. 10
The adoption of any surname was legally permissible, provided
the name was not used fraudulently or to deceive or inflict
pecuniary loss on another person.'1 Well into the nineteenth cen-
tury the endowment of the patronymic on a newly born child
was recognized "only as a general rule from which the individual
may depart if he chooses." 1 2 The common law asserted only a
casual supervision over the use of surnames.
The use of surnames by married women was similarly unpre-
6 See part I B infra.
7 See part I II D infra.
8 See part V infra.
9 C. EWEN, A HISTORY OF SURNAMES OF THE BRITISH ISLES (1931).
10 Petition of Snook, N.Y. (2 Hilton) 566, 571 (C. P. 1859).
1 DuBoulay v. DuBoulay, [1869] L.R. 2 P.C. 430.
12 Laflin and Rand Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434,442 (1892).
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dictable. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it was not
unusual for a married heiress to retain her father's family name. 13
One commentator suggests that it was more common for a man to
take his wife's surname than for the wife to drop hers. 14 Today,
English common law still does not require a woman to take her
husband's surname after marriage.'
5
B. The Status of the Right Today
Legal impediments to the retention or reacquisition of a wom-
an's birth-given name derive primarily from judicial mis-
interpretation or misapplications of the common law of name
change. Only Hawaii statutorily requires the use of the husband's
name 16 and only Kentucky refuses by statute' 7 to permit women
to reassume their maiden names after marriage.18 This section will
therefore focus on the primary area of confrontation- recent judi-
cial treatment of the common law right, with particular emphasis
on decisions of the courts of Massachusetts.
The common law clearly permits individuals and business en-
tities to acquire names by repute.
It is well settled that a person or corporation may assume or
be known by different names, and contract accordingly, and
that contracts so entered into will be valid and binding if
unaffected by fraud. The validity, so far as third parties are
concerned, of contracts entered into by a person or corpo-
ration under a name other than his or its proper name does
13 C. EWEN, supra note 9, at 389.
14 L. PINE, THE STORY OF SURNAMES 23 (1966), cited in MacDougall. supra note 2, at
4, n.18.
15 19 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 391 (3d ed. 1970). See also part I C infra.
16 HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 3 1, §§ 574-1 et seq. (1968).
17 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.010 (1971). For a comprehensive listing of all state
statutes bearing any relevance to name changes, see Lamber, A Married Woman's Sur-
name: Is Custom Law? 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 779, 809-19. This has since been re-
pealed.- Ed.
18 There are some indications that both states will soon be relinquishing their dubious
unique status. See CENTER FOR A WOMAN'S OWN NAME, BOOKLET FOR WOMEN WHO
WISH TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN NAME AFTER MARRIAGE 32 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as BOOKLET]:
Litigation has recently resulted in allowing married women to vote in their
own names in Kentucky. and it is likely that the constitutionality of the
Kentucky name change statute will be challenged.
See also id. at 7: "A recent Hawaiian Attorney General opinion states that 'there is no
prohibition against a married woman changing her name subsequent to the marriage.' ";
Bysiewicz & MacDonnell, Married Women's Surnames, 5 CONN. L. REV. 598. 603 n.14
(1973), assert that the Hawaiian law may soon be found unconstitutional under a recently
passed equal rights amendment to the Hawaiian Constitution [1972] Hawaii Laws 650).
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not depend on whether he or it is as well known by that name
as by his or its true name, but upon whether quoad the
particular transaction, the name is used in good faith by the
party adopting it as descriptio personae. 19
Hence, if a woman can assume a name by using it and developing
a reputation under the common law standard, it seems clear that
she can use her maiden name under that same standard, whether
she "reacquires" that name after marriage or retains it upon
marriage.
If the situation of a married woman who has adopted her
husband's surname is equivalent to that of anyone adopting a
name other than that given at birth, then she should be allowed to
change her name in accordance with the law; she may either
petition the probate court or acquire her maiden name by reputa-
tion. Alternatively, if Jane Doe automatically becomes Jane Doe
Roe upon marriage, though she has no intention of using that
name, then the common law right to use a "different" name
should still be hers. In short, by informing people that she will
continue to be known as Jane Doe, and by maintaining or acquir-
ing identification in her maiden name, Jane Doe Roe should
become Jane Doe again. In effect, the common law right to
change of name by reputation can therefore be construed to allow
a woman to retain her maiden name. 20
In addition to the right to change one's surname by reputation,
many states allow probate courts to change surnames:
A petition for change of name of a person may be heard by
the probate court in the county where the petitioner resides.
No change of the name of a person, except upon the adoption
of a child or upon the marriage or divorce of a woman, shall
19 William Gilligan Co. v. Casey, 205 Mass. 26, 91 N.E.124 (1910). Cf. Young v.
Jewell, 201 Mass. 385,386, 87 N.E. 604 (1909): "Where a person is in fact known by two
names, either one can be used." See also Petition of Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 338, 77
N.E.2d 216,218 (1948):
A man, if acting honestly, may assume any name he desires and by which
he wishes to be known in the community in which he lives or in the trade
circles in which he does his business. The law does not require a man to
retain and to perpetuate the surname of his ancestors. The common law
recognizes his freedom of choice to assume a name which he deems more
appropriate and advantageous to him than his family name in his present
circumstances, if the change is not motivated by fraudulent intent.
Cf. Lord v. Cummings, 303 Mass. 457, 22 N.E.2d 26 (1939).
20 For a good discussion of the existence of a woman's common law right to retain her
surname after marriage, see Lamber, supra note 17. See also BOOKLET, supra note 18, at
29-36; Brief for Amicus Curiae Center for a Woman's Own Name on Behalf of
Plaintiff-Appellant, Whitlow v. Hodges, No. 74-1726 (6th Cir. August, 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Whitlow Brief].
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be lawful unless made by said court for a sufficient reason
consistent with the public interest.21
Despite the seemingly exclusive language of the statute, Mas-
sachusetts courts have held that one may change one's name
without resort to the statutory procedure.2 2 In Mark v. Kahn, 23
for example, the court stated:
At common law a person may change his name at will .... by
merely adopting another name, provided that this was done
for an honest purpose .... G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c.210 § 12 does
not restrict a person's choice of name but aids him in securing
an official record which definitely and specifically establishes
his change of name.
An elaboration of this theme was made in Petition of Merolev-
itz:24
We assume, in view of the wording of our statute, (G.L. [Ter.
Ed.] c.210, § 12), that it provides the only method by which
one can change his name with legal effect. But it does not
follow that one may not assume or use another name without
resort to the statute if such use is for an honest purpose. In
numerous cases 25 decided after the passage of the statute it
has been recognized that without compliance with it one may
use another name for contracting business, making contracts,
instituting or defending lawsuits, and acquiring and transfer-
ring title to property, where such use is not tainted by fraud.
... Section 12, construed in the light of these decisions, does
not in our opinion require compliance with its provisions in
order that one may use another name, if such use is for an
honest purpose.
The statute says that no change of name shall be effective
without compliance with the statutory procedure. If a woman
retains her birth-given name for all purposes after marriage, there-
fore, one can argue that the law of name change is inapposite. If
21 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 212 (1931).
22 See also BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 29-36.
23333 Mass. 517, 520, 131 N.E.2d 758, 761 (1956). Cf. Petition of Buyarsky. 322
Mass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216 (1948).
24320 Mass. 448,450, 70 N.E.2d 249, 250 (1946).
1 See, e.g., Bridges v. Hart, 302 Mass. 239, 18 N.E.2d 1020 (1939); Young v. Jewell,
201 Mass. 385, 87 N.E. 604 (1909); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 188 Mass. 550, 75 N.E. 151
(1905); Lancy v. Snow. 180 Mass. 411, 62 N.E. 735 (1902); Commonwealth v. Seeley.
167 Mass. 163 (1896); Gillespie v. Rogers, 146 Mass. 610, 16 N.E. 711 (1888); Com-
monwealth v. Trainor, 123 Mass. 414 (1877); Gifford v. Rockett, 121 Mass. 431 (1877);
Commonwealth v. Gale, 77 Mass.(I I Gray) 320 (1858); Sowle v. Sowle, 27 Mass. (10
Pickering) 376 (1830).
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one's name does not change at marriage, the qualifying word does
not apply; the statute is irrelevant where a woman's name has
never been that of her husband. Similarly, there is no need to
develop a new reputation at common law if one's name has never
been different.
Inimical to such a statutory construction are a limited number
of cases which may indicate that a woman's surname automat-
ically becomes that of her husband upon marriage. Whether other
courts or state administrators will follow these decisions or not, at
least some limitations have effectively been imposed upon the
women's surname retention right.
According to a number of writers involved in the women's
name change controversy, 26 only three cases have directly ruled
on the woman's common law right to retain her surname after
marriage: People ex rel Rago v. Lipsky;27 State ex rel Krupa v.
Green;2 and Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections.29 Lip-
sky is the only decision holding against the right; and a com-
bination of illogical statutory construction3" and a later Illinois
Attorney General's opinion 3 weakens the decision's precedential
value. 32
Although not directly dealing with the issue of the common law
right of surname retention, the Supreme Court's memorandum
affirmance in Forbush v. Wallace33 has fueled much of the recent
legal opposition to the recognition of such a right. In that case, a
married woman who used her maiden name for all purposes at-
tempted to get a driver's license bearing her maiden name. An
unwritten regulation of the Alabama Department of Public Safety
required a married woman to apply for and receive her license
only in her husband's name. The regulation was apparently based
upon an interpretation of Alabama common law that a woman's
"legal" name is that of her husband.34 The District Court for the
26 See, e.g., Lamber, supra note 17, at 783; Whitlow Brief, supra note 20, at 27.
27 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
28 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (196 1).
29 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
30 Lamber, supra note 17, at 791-92.
31 Whitlow Brief, supra note 20, at 28-29:
I do not believe that this appellate decision should control. The other Illinois
decisions and cases elsewhere establish that a woman may in fact retain her
own name upon marriage with or without court proceedings. (Ill. Op. Att'y
Gen., February 13, 1974).
32 The Ohio Court of Appeals held directly contrary to the Lipsky decision. Stuart is
discussed in notes 43-47 and accompanying text infra.
23 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd mem. 405 U.S. 970 (1972).




Middle District of Alabama upheld the state's right to require the
husband's surname on driver's licenses,3 5 and the Supreme Court
affirmed on that issue.
Ms. Forbush conceded that the Alabama common law was that
a woman's legal name after marriage included her husband's sur-
name.3 6 This concession was at least sufficient to undermine the
precedential value of the case with respect to the assertion of a
common law right of surname retention.3 7 At worst, the con-
cession may be viewed as a tactical error that has resulted in the
development of a precedent employed by other courts to deny a
woman's right to retain her surname after marriage. 38
Forbush argued that the regulation and the common law rule
operated as denials of equal protection for two reasons: first, they
were based upon a suspect classification (sex);3 9 and second, they
established a classification pursuant to an arbitrary and unreason-
able policy which bore no rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose. Ms. Forbush did not win on either ground.
The district court declined to decide whether or not sex was a
suspect classification. 40 The court held that it was not unreason-
able for the state to require each individual to receive his license
in his legal name and that Alabama's common law rule was not a
violation of equal protection. The Alabama law defining a wom-
an's legal name as that of her husband was held to be rational not
only because of long standing custom and the need for uniformity
but also for reasons of administrative convenience. 4' The Su-
preme Court of the United States affirmed without opinion. 42
Shortly after the Forbush decision, the Maryland Court of
Appeals decided Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for
Howard County.43 The case concerned opposition to Md. Ann.
Code art. 33, § 3-18(c), which required that a woman re-register
to vote in her married name in order to avoid cancellation of her
35 341 F. Supp. 217.
36 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
37 See Whitlow Brief, supra note 20. at 12-14.
38 See BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 29-36, for a summary of recent cases.
11 See Lamber, supra note 17, at 801-03, arguing that the suspect classification ques-
tions bear careful re-examination after the Supreme Court opinion in Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
40341 F. Supp. 217 at 221.
41 See Lamber. supra note 17, at 798-99, 804-07. Prof. Lamber argues that "custom"
does not constitute a rational basis for classification; that uniformity does not exist at
present and therefore would not. truly be disrupted: and that it was factually untrue that
administrative convenience would be sacrificed.
42 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
4 266 Md. 440. 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
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registration. Ms. Stuart, who had always used her maiden name
and was therefore permitted to register in that name, was nonethe-
less informed that her registration would be cancelled. She argued
that the common law permits a woman to retain her surname after
marriage. The Forbush omission was avoided.
The Board contended that, although Maryland common law
permitted a person to assume any name for a nonfraudulent pur-
pose, such rights were not extended to married women because of
§ 3-18(a)(3) of the Maryland Code.44 The Maryland court re-
jected the Board's argument. The court held that the common law
rule was effective in Maryland, even with respect to married
women, and that changes of name by married women were
changes by custom and in fact, rather than by operation of law:
[A] married woman's surname does not become that of her
husband where, as here, she evidences a clear intent to con-
sistently and non-fraudently use her birth given name sub-
sequent to marriage. Thus, while under Romans, a married
woman may choose to adopt the surname of her hus-
band-this being the long standing custom and tradition
which has resulted in the vast majority of women adopting
their husbands surnames as their own-the mere fact of the
marriage does not, as a matter of law, operate to establish the
custom and tradition of the majority as a rule of law binding
on all. 45
Noting that is was not bound by the Alabama common law as
interpreted by Forbush, 46 the court, citing abundant English au-
thority on the issue,
... expressly followed the 1961 American case of State ex rel
Krupa v. Green, [citation omitted] which had held that a
voting registration statute referring to persons who had
changed their names by "marriage or otherwise" did not
apply to women who did not change their names at marriage.
47
The trend toward increasing recognition of the surname reten-
tion right far from signifies an outright acceptance of such a
policy, especially by low-level bureaucrats. 48 In Massachusetts,
44 MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-18(a)(3)(1973). See MacDougall, supra note 2, at 2, 3.
The statute requires county officials to file with voting boards the present and former
names of females over twenty-one years of age whose names have been changed by
marriage.
0 266 Md. 440,447, 295 A.2d 223, 226-27 (1972).
4 266 Md. 440 at 446 n.2, 295 A.2d 223 at 226 (1972).
47 Whitlow Brief, supra note 20, at 23.
48 See part II infra.
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for example, there is no statute that either requires a married
woman to use her husband's surname or that permits her to
employ her maiden name. The sole cases which discuss the legal-
ity of a married woman's name, though easily distinguishable on
the facts from the situations in which a married woman uses her
maiden name for all purposes after marriage, do state that a
married woman's legal name is that of her husband. The law, then,
is ostensibly inconclusive; therefore, it is inconsistently applied.
Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry. 49 is often cited for the proposi-
tion that in Massachusetts a woman's legal surname upon mar-
riage is that of her husband. 50 In that case, Alice W. Bacon, a
married woman, sought to recover for personal injuries and for
damage to her automobile suffered in an accident with defendant's
vehicle. The plaintiff was exercising due care and the defendant
was negligent. Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff was
not entitled to recovery because her automobile was registered in
her maiden name. Under the then current law, an automobile that
was not legally registered 51 was considered a "nuisance on the
highway" and the owner thereof could not recover for damages
because invalid registration was considered to be negligence per
se. Citing ch. 208, § 23 of the General Laws, 52 which enabled a
woman to assume her maiden name after divorce, the court held
that the plaintiffs legal name was Alice W. Bacon. However, in
that case, Mrs. Bacon used her husband's surname for all pur-
poses (including income taxation and driver's license) except au-
tomobile registration.
The Bacon court thus did not have before it a situation in
which a woman used her maiden name in all cases. Few would
gainsay the fact that since Mrs. Bacon used her husband's sur-
name the common law rendered that her legal name. The case is
therefore inapposite.
In Korsun v. McManus, 53 an invalidly married woman had
used her maiden name for employment and her "married" name
(Korsun) for her automobile registration. Since the plaintiff was
generally known by her "married" name, the court stated that to
register the automobile under Korsun was not an invalid or negli-
gent act. It was thus clearly established that a woman (as well as a
man) could change her name by repute.
4 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 351 (1926).
5 0 See, e.g., Koley v. Williams, 265 Mass. 601, 164 N.E. 444 (1929).
5' MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 (1946).
52 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 23 (1931).
53 318 Mass. 642, 63 N.E.2d 457 (1945).
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The Massachusetts courts have continued to enforce the name
change statute,54 claiming that it merely expands and makes
official one's common law right to assume any nonfraudulent
name.55 The only cases in which it has been held that a woman's
legal name is that of her husband on marriage have been automo-
bile registration cases. 56 However, the absence of a clearly de-
fined legal mandate has forced some women to use their married
names on car registrations, presumably because their husbands'
surnames are their "legal" names. The courts continue to over-
look the legal/nonlegal name distinction in cases of male regis-
trants.
57
C. Other Legal Systems
The alleged administrative inconvenience resulting from wom-
en's use of surnames different from those of their husbands does
not appear to have necessitated a curtailment of this right in other
countries. It is customary in civil law countries for women to
retain their birth-given names, and Louisiana's succession to
French law has meant that women in that state may legally use
their maiden names after marriage. 58
The trend in western countries has been to permit women
greater rights in the use of their maiden names. For example, the
German cabinet drafted legislation which would enable couples to
adopt the wife's surname or a combination of both names if either
alternative were preferred to use of the husband's surname
alone. 59 In Italy, the Chamber of Deputies approved a reform
which would no longer require a wife to replace her surname with
54 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (1931).
55 See note 23 supra.
56 Korsun v. McManus, 318 Mass. 642, 63 N.E.2d 457 (1945); Koley v. Williams, 265
Mass. 601, 164 N.E. 444 (1929); Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry., 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E.
35 (1926).
57 In Bridges v. Hart, 302 Mass. 239, 18 N.E.2d 1020 (1939), Theophilus Doucette was
permitted to recover damages for an accident though his automobile was registered under
the name of Thomas Douey. He had never effected a "legal" change of name in probate
court. Since the purpose of the automobile registration statute was found to be to "afford
identification of the owner and of the motor vehicle," id. at 243, 18 N.E.2d at 1022, the
court decided that the car was legally registered since Doucette was generally known as
Douey. Since the courts have permitted automobile registrations under "non-legal" names,
were the Massachusetts registrar to require a woman to use her "legal" name when she
was not commonly known by that name, a compelling equal protection argument could be
established.
58 L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 43 (1969). Cf. Succession of Kneipp, 172 La.
411, 134 So. 376 (193 1); Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 245 La.
145, 157 So.2d 718 (1963).
59 N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1973. at 4, col. 3; N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 197 l, at 2. col. 4.
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that of her husband, and which would give all married women a
hyphenated name consisting of their own surname plus that of
their husband.60
There have similarly been few barriers to a wife retaining her
birth-given name in common law countries. In Wales, Scotland,
and Ireland, married women commonly retain their maiden
names, particularly if they are of higher birth. 61 English common
law, as noted above,6 2 expressly permits married women to retain
their own surnames: 63
But although it is an almost universal custom for a married
woman to be known by her husband's surname, it is quite
open to her to retain her maiden name if she wishes. There is,
so far as I know, nothing to compel a married woman to use
her husband's surname. (In re Fry, [1945] Ch. 348 (per Vase-
ly, J.)).6 4
II. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED:
ELECTIONS, VOTING RIGHTS, AND PASSPORTS
The unresolved state of the law has often led to obstinance on
the part of low-level bureaucrats charged with the duty to receive
and process forms and applications. Under a mistaken impression
of what the law demands, a clerk may thwart the will of a woman
who is seeking only to exercise her lawful rights. As a result,
permission for a married woman to use her maiden name on forms
is frequently denied because the clerk believes that the "legal"
married name is the required one.
This bureaucratic opposition and inconsistency can be seen as
creating the following unnecessary consequences: (a) women who
are timid about putting up a fight must acquiesce and use their
husbands' names in order to accomplish their goal (such as the
receipt of a driver's license); (b) women who are less intimidated
must suffer harassment6 5 or go to considerable trouble to protect
60 N.Y. TIMES, December 5, 1971, at 125, col. 4.
61 C. EWEN, supra note 9, at 391.
62 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
I See especially J. JOSLING, CHANGE OF NAME 24 (8th ed. 1964).
"
4 d.
65 Similar harassment, engendered by marital status, not marital name, is evidenced by
the following story related in I WOMEN'S RIGHTS L.R. 27 (Spring 1972):
When Dr. Donna Brogan tried to register to vote in De Kalb County
recently, she was refused because she declined to say whether she was
married or single. [She then asked to see the Registrar.]
"He (Thomas) [the registrar] told me I was a stupid woman and asked me
why I was causing all this trouble."
Thomas replied:... "When a woman marries, the Bible says the two
become one flesh."...
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their rights; and (c) women who wish to reacquire their maiden
names by repute are not able easily to procure identification
necessary to prove their names, despite the fact that they may be
known to others by their maiden names.
The dimensions of the problem can be more fully appreciated in
light of some specific instances of official inflexibility. The gravity
of the consequences may vary with each encounter, but the frus-
tration and inequitability do not.
An instructive case is that of Gail Dunfey, a city councilwoman
in Lowell, Massachusetts, who married Ronald Sinicki. 66 Prior to
her marriage, Ms. Dunfey had announced that she wished to
retain her maiden name. Yet, at the next city council meeting
following her wedding, the city clerk insisted on calling out
'Councillor Sinicki" on roll call votes. The clerk claimed that
Durifey's legal name was Sinicki unless the court ordered other-
wise. Dunfey refused to answer to her husband's surname.
Ms. Dunfey then won a temporary restraining order barring the
clerk from using her married name on roll calls. In addition, the
city solicitor ruled that Dunfey was the councilwoman's name
since she was known by that name. Nevertheless, the ultimate
outcome of this controversy was that Dunfey lost her seat in the
next election. She attributed her defeat to "the unpopularity of her
decision among female voters,"'6 7 and claimed that her refusal to
change her name
was blown up all out of proportion in the Lowell press. There
was a cartoon about it, it was editorialized against and there
were letters to the Editor.68
What would probably have gone unnoticed, had the clerk coop-
erated with Ms. Dunfey, became a public issue which ostensibly
resulted in an election loss wholly unrelated to Dunfey's perform-
ance of her duties.
A second example concerns Diana Altman and Gladys Wald-
man, both of whom were married but had never used their mar-
ried names.69 After their marriages, the women attempted to
register to vote in their maiden names, but the election registrar in
66 The following sources were utilized for this example: Negri, supra note 3 at 3, col. 1;
Boston Globe, June 4. 1973. at 6, col. 4; Boston Globe, June 16, 1973, at 7, col. 2; Boston
Globe, November 8, 1973, at 8, col. 1.
67 Boston Globe, November 8, 1973. at 8, col. 1.
68 Negri, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1.
69 The sources for this example were: Goodman, 2 Women Battle, Win Right to Vote
under Maiden Name, Boston Globe, April 9, 1972, at 27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 9,
1972, at 54, col. 8; personal interview with Diana Altman.
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Newton, Massachusetts, refused to allow them to do so. After a
great deal of frustration, the women appealed the registrar's deci-
sion. The city solicitor said that no law compelled a woman to
register in her husband's name if she were generally known by
another name. The common law requirement of repute was
sufficient for voting purposes.
In response to the decision, the city election commission finally
voted to permit married women who use their birth-given names
to register in those names. Several other Massachusetts commu-
nities followed suit, while others such as Arlington have still
refused to permit women to register in their birthgiven names. 70
Finally, encounters with the passport office have produced
similarly annoying and unnecessary obstacles to surname reten-
tion. 71 In order for a woman to receive a passport in her maiden
name, she must submit affidavits and documents which attest to
the fact that she is known by her own name in her community.72
This is true even though she may never have used any other name
and all her identification is in her own surname. As one author
aptly notes, although there are no official regulations dealing with
married women who want to use their birth-given names:
The Passport Office requires proof of a married woman's
identity only when she uses her own name, a name she has
generally used all her life. 73
70 See also BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 29-36.
71 See, e.g., Ms. MAGAZINE, March, 1974, at 7:
I had the only tantrum of my life last year when I went down to get my
first passport, all excited about my first trip to Europe, and found that they
wouldn't give me one. My maiden name (Stoll) was not my legal name. Well,
I said in desperation, put Schneidhorst then. They couldn't do that either,
because I had no identification with that name on it. (I had been using Stoll
exclusively for the five years since my divorce.) So, for one horrible moment,
I had no name at all, and they would'nt give me a passport.
It isn't really the fault of the people at the passport office, my lawyer friend
tells me. They have to be sure that nobody gets more than one passport. And
the passport office has a solution. They have a special form which must be
filled out by a close relative (your mother or father, if they are living) and
notarized, attesting to the fact that your name is really your name. I'm 34
years old, and I have to have a paper signed by my mother to prove that I am
who I have always been ....
Patricia Stoll
Chicago, Ill.
72 See BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 9.
73 U. STANNARD, MARRIED WOMEN V. HUSBANDS' NAMEs 47 (1973). See also part V B
infra.
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III. LEGAL AVENUES TOWARD SOLUTIONS
OF THE PROBLEM
As the previous section demonstrates, by far the greatest
difficulty encountered by women who wish to retain their maiden
names is that of surmounting administrative barriers. On appeal,
many agencies and city solicitors recognize a woman's right to her
own name. However, it is at the lowest bureaucratic level that
women would like to be able to assert their rights, thereby avoid-
ing the necessity for an appeal. Therefore, an official, conclusive
statement of the right of married women to use their own sur-
names is needed. It must be unambiguous and must clearly ex-
clude bureaucratic discretion. Such a statement, presumably,
would convince clerks that a married woman may use her
birth-given name on official documents.
There appear to be four possible sources 74 of an appropriate
statement: (a) a state supreme court decision; (b) an opinion of the
Attorney General; (c) a statute; and (d) the Equal Rights Amend-
ment.
A. State Supreme Court Decision
A court decision would not only bind the parties before the
court but would influence agencies and other instrumentalities
which ordinarily require people to submit names for some pur-
pose. However, several problems arise when one attempts to
procure a judicial pronouncement that the name of a married
woman is that by which she is generally known in her community.
First, it may prove difficult to get a case before the highest court.
Lower courts are likely to hold that a woman who is commonly
known by a name may use it; unfortunately, such decisions are
binding only upon the court which renders the opinion. Having
received a favorable decision, a woman cannot appeal, and the
agency may not wish to spend time appealing a seemingly trivial
issue with little chance of reversal. In effect, the great possibility
of a woman's success in a lower court proceeding may ironically
subvert the ultimate goal of a supreme court pronouncement.
The second major difficulty with seeking a state supreme court
decision is that the effort is often time-consuming and costly. The
derivable benefits may not appear to merit the battle. Finally,
there remains the unavoidable risk that a supreme court decision
would be unfavorable.
74 The use of antenuptial contracts is another alternative, although their enforceability is
contingent upon the state's recognition of a surname retention right.
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B. Opinion of the Attorney General
Statutes often provide that the Attorney General must give
opinions when requested to do so by agency heads. 75 If a test case
arises, a request could be made of one or two agencies to seek an
opinion from the Attorney General on the question of a married
woman's right to use her maiden name. In Massachusetts, the
request could be made either to the chairperson of the Massachu-
setts Commission Against Discrimination or to the Governor's
Commission on the Status of Women.
This route has significant advantages. The elapsed time be-
tween a request and an opinion is likely to be less than six
months, obviating the problem of protracted judicial appeals or
statutory lobbying efforts. Secondly, an opinion of the Attorney
General in many states is likely to be favorable. 76 In a recent
opinion the Massachusetts Attorney General wrote:
[A] woman who has retained the use of her maiden name
after her marriage is not compelled by Massachusetts law to
assume her husband's surname for any purpose. 77
The primary disadvantage of getting an attorney general's opin-
ion is that it is not binding on anyone. Nevertheless, any "official"
document may be sufficient to convince bureaucrats that it is
possible for a woman to keep her maiden name.
C. Statute
A statute can serve one very significant function that no other
method of securing a conclusive statement of law does: it can
provide a means for the recordation of a name. So long as married
women are conventionally expected to use their husbands' names,
women who choose to do otherwise may be encouraged to assert
their own names by having available to them an official record
which establishes their "true" names. In addition, since a record-
ation of name choice may be kept at a central location, govern-
mental agencies and others can easily refer to a woman's name
usage within the state.
Furthermore, a statute that codifies the right of married women
to use their maiden names might bind people who deal with
71 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 3 (1931).
76 See Whitlow Brief, supra note 20, at 6. 25-29, for favorable opinions from the
following states: California. Illinois. Maine, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
77 74/75-5 MASS. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 3 (1974).
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married women. Additionally, a bill may be made almost imme-
diately effective. Such an enactment would avoid both the risk
and the delay of a court action. If the bill does not pass, women
will still be entitled to their common law rights. 78 At worst, the
bill's defeat might cause bureaucrats to take less flexible stands on
name use. Passage of the bill, on the other hand, would provide
low-level bureaucrats with an explicit statement that would permit
no discretionary avoidance.
However, this method of obtaining a conclusive statement of
the law presents problems. First, many feminists object to any
statute because it may end up limiting common law rights already
in existence. If a bill were enacted, it might require a statement of
intent to use one's own surname after marriage or the payment of
a fee; some women object that such a system would entail posi-
tive action where none has been or should be required.79 Second-
ly, professional politicians may not wish to risk supporting name
rights as a campaign issue, particularly since women already have
a common law right. As the Gail Dunfey controversy demon-
strated,80 the right of married women to use their birth-given
surnames is not always a popular cause, even among women; nor
is it considered by many to be a significant issue in light of other
problems facing women in American society.8 1
D. The Equal Rights Amendment
Awaiting ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment as a
solution to the surname retention controversy may involve a
considerable delay before the significance of the amendment is felt
in the bureaucracy. Once passed, however, the effect of the
amendment will be clear:
The Equal Rights Amendment would not permit a legal
requirement, or even a legal presumption, that a woman takes
her husband's name at the time of marriage. . . . Thus,
common law and statutory rules requiring name change for
the married woman would become legal nullities .... [Tihe
legal barriers would have been removed for a woman who
wanted to use a name that was not her husband's.
Some state legislatures might decide there was a govern-
mental interest, such as identification, in requiring spouses to
78 See part I B supra.
79 See, e.g., Lamber, supra note 17, at 807.
80 See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
81 See, e.g., notes 91-92 and accompanying text infra.
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'have the same last name. These states could conform to the
Equal Rights Amendment by requiring couples to pick the
same last name, but allowing selection of the name of either
spouse, or of a third name satisfactory to both.
8 2
Consequently, the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment
could obviate the necessity for resorting to any of the previously
discussed legal strategies. On the other hand, the amendment's
future is uncertain; even if it is ratified, a significant amount of
time would remain before the amendment became effectiveP
Other courses of action may yield more timely results.
IV. AN EFFORT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM: THE QUEST
FOR STATUTORY REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS
The recent history of proposed name change legislation in the
Massachusetts legislature 4 demonstrates that, in an ostensibly
sympathetic community and a ripe political setting, such efforts
may yet meet with substantial opposition and defeat. The example
is, nevertheless, instructive from the standpoint of tactics drafting.
In 1972 a bill8 5 was filed which would have enabled a woman
who wished to use her maiden name to do so after filing a notice
of intent with the "officer authorized by law to receive the certifi-
cate of marriage" and after paying the Commonwealth one dollar.
The bill was sent to the Judicial Council, 6 which returned an
unfavorable report the next year.8 7 The Judiciary Committee also
82 Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871,940 (197 1).
3 Id. at 909.
84 Bills dealing with women's name change rights introduced in the 1974 session of the
Massachusetts legislature include: S. 1098 (filing notice of intent to retain maiden name
after marriage); S. 1072 (same); S. 909 (allowing divorced woman to use maiden or
married name); S. 197 (filing notice of intent for both spouses to use either name or
hyphenated combination); H. 3716 (same as S. 909); H. 3527 (allowing filing to retain
surname and to use same name for children); H. 3490 (voting right in maiden name); H.
2729 (same); H. 1004 (prohibiting discrimination in all identification activities); and H. 275
(same as S. 1098).
a H. 3367 (1972).
86 The Judicial Council is an independent study group hired by the legislature to
consider social legislation.
87 The following is the text of the report:
In the class action brought by Ms. Wendy Forbush (and others similarly
situated) against Governor George Wallace of Alabama, 92 S.Ct. 1197
(1972), it was held that an Alabama law requiring a woman to assume her
husband's surname upon marriage had a rational basis and was enacted to
control an area where the state had a legitimate interest. The Alabama case
involved a driver's license.
We are mindful that a person may call himself or herself by any name at
all, unless there is an illegal aspect to the matter.
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reported the bill unfavorably. When the Committee report came
to the floor of the Senate for approval, Senator Saltonstall unex-
pectedly moved to substitute a new bill which had been hastily
drafted by Kathy Brock, an aide to Senator Parker. Although the
bill was poorly written, it passed its first reading. A move for
reconsideration was then defeated. The bill also passed its second
reading in the Senate and a subsequent move to kill the bill was
unsuccessful. It was finally returned to the Judiciary Committee
where it died in the rush of prorogation.
Meanwhile, the Women's Lobby Task Force on Name Change
was working on its own name change bill."" While they hoped that
the Saltonstall bill would not be defeated, the group nonetheless
felt that a better bill could be written.8 9 The Saltonstall bill's fate
during prorogation was therefore greeted with some relief. In the
1974 session of the Massachusetts legislature, the Women's Lob-
by bill was officially filed as S. 197.90 At least eight other bills
The Commonwealth and its subdivisions must keep many public records
which have been based on the assumption by a married woman of her
husband's name.
If a married woman continued to carry on her legal affairs under her
maiden name, a great amount of confusion and uncertainty would result.
There is a rational basis to the present system. Some married women might
have problems conducting business under their maiden name if they sought
to pledge the credit of their husband.
For those married women who wish to use their maiden name on social
occasions, and where serious legal affairs are not involved, we see no prob-
lem nor the necessity for any legislation.
We believe that the Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in maintaining
usable public records, and this interest will suffer if some women should,
although married, use their "maiden" name while most probably would
continue to use the name of their husband.
We do not recommend this bill.
a Information concerning the strategy of the Task Force was gathered by the author at
the Task Force meetings.
89 id.
90 The bill included the following provisions:
An Act Providing for a Procedure for the Recording of the Choice of Name
at Marriage.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General
Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: ...
Section 2. Chapter 26 of the General Law is hereby further amended by
inserting after section IC the following section:-
Section ID. The parties to the marriage shall have the right to jointly adopt
the present or birth-given surname of either party, to each retain or resume
use of his or her present or birth-given surname, or to adopt any hyphenated
combination thereof. A person's name does not change at marriage by oper-
ation of law except as recorded on the record of marriage.
Section 3. Chapter 210 of the General Laws is hereby amended by striking
out section 12, as appearing in the Tercentenary Edition, and inserting in
place thereof the following section:
Section 12. A petition for the change of name of a person may be heard by
the probate court in the county where the petitioner resides. The change of
name of a person shall be granted unless such change is inconsistent with
public interests.
Married Women's Surnames
relating to name choice had also been filed. 91 Because of the
unexpected success of the Saltonstall bill in the last session, there
was some hope that a maiden name bill would be enacted in the
1974 session. But the bill was eventually defeated in the lower
chamber.92
An examination of the language of the Women's Lobby bill
sheds further light on the lobbying strategy. The bill would have
amended ch. 46, § 1 of the General Laws, 93 which provided for
the recordation of vital statistics by the town clerk. Initially the
bill had been written to amend ch. 207 of the General Laws9 4
which required couples to file a notice of intention to marry.
However, ch. 207 stated only that the certificate was to include
such "information required at law," whereas ch. 46, § 1 spelled
out the details of this information. Section 17 of chapter 4695
required that town clerks submit annually to the Secretary of the
Commonwealth all information appearing on marriage certificates.
Thus, the bill served the centralized recordkeeping function so
crucial to an enjoyment of a name change right. The marriage
license itself would have served as official documentation of a
married woman's name. "Birth-given" name was used rather than
"maiden" name, because it was possible under the bill for males
to adopt names other than those given to them at birth.
The parties to the marriage were given a choice of using the
surname of either partner, adopting a hyphenated combination of
their names, or retaining (or resuming in the case of previously
married parties) their own birth-given names. As originally writ-
ten the bill enabled marriage partners to adopt any new name, but
some politicians felt that the bill would be too revolutionary to
pass in that form. 96 The drafters of the bill believed that the
development of names at common law by reputation or by peti-
tion in probate court were sufficient available alternatives for
persons desiring to assume an entirely new name.
Perhaps the most important provision of the bill was in the last
sentence of Section ID: "A person's name does not change at
marriage by operation of law except as recorded on the certificate
of marriage." This statement eliminated the presumption that Jane
Doe becomes Jane Doe Roe automatically on her marriage to
91 See note 84 supra.
92 S. 197 passed the Senate three times, and was subsequently defeated by a vote of
95-103 in the House.
93 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 1 (1960).
94 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 19 (1969).
95 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 17 (1960).
" See note 89 supra.
FALL 19741
Journal of Law Reform
John Roe. Her name could change as a matter of fact; that is, if
she were to change her records on marriage, and tell people that
she is Mrs. Roe, the common law would establish her new name.
However, the important distinction is that Jane Doe, who wishes
to remain Jane Doe, would not necessarily have become Jane Roe
by virtue of the decision of a bureaucrat.
Section 3 of the bill eliminated the following sentence from the
current Massachusetts name change statute:
No change of the name of a person, except upon the adoption
of a child or upon the marriage or divorce of a woman, shall
be lawful unless made by said court for a sufficient reason
consistent with the public interest.97
Since a change of name could have been effected by either sex
simply by recording the name at marriage by both spouses, the
provision quoted above would have been meaningless. One of the
bill's basic purposes was to reaffirm the common law right to
change one's name.
Finally, the new bill would have created a presumption in favor
of the legality of a person's changing his or her name. An
affirmative right would exist that could be countered only if the
change were inconsistent with the public interest. This section
codified the rule of Petition of Rusconi,98 in which the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts limited a judge's discretion in the
granting of a petition for a name change. The lower court had
denied a petitioner's request to change his name from Rusconi to
Bryan on grounds that the change was "un-American" and an
insult to Italians. The court reversed, holding:
It is not open to the Court to inquire into the motives that
prompt one to change one's name, provided, of course, they
are not for dishonest or unlawful ends.99
Nor did the bill require a petitioner to pay a filing fee. Since the
notice of intention to use a certain name after marriage would be
recorded on the marriage certificate and on the marriage records
in the town clerk's office, there should exist no additional adminis-
trative burden which could justify a special fee. Should a bill be
passed permitting couples to register a name change other than at
the time of marriage, a small fee could be charged to cover the
expense.
97 S. 197 (1974).
98 341 Mass. 167, 167 N.E.2d 847 (1960).
99 341 Mass. 167 at 170, 167 N.E.2d 847 at 850 (1960).
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Those who objected to the necessity to file or to pay a fee
could, of course, have continued to assert their common law right
to any name they choose.100 Once again, however, there is a risk
that if a bill such as S. 197 is passed, it may be interpreted to
preempt a married person's common law right to change her or his
name by repute. 10
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROVIDING WOMEN WITH
A CHOICE OF NAME
In a society where written records play a major role, the name
that one uses is significant. The state has a legitimate interest in
preventing confusion in the identification of individuals and in
preventing fraud on third parties. Furthermore, in the United
States there is a strong expectation that married women will use
the surnames of their husbands after marriage.' 0 2 As long as this
expectation exists, confusion may result if a woman continues to
use her maiden name, at least with respect to strangers. Yet, the
common law right to use any nonfraudulent name' 0 3 also antici-
pates a certain possibility of misidentification until one has be-
come well known by his or her new name.
The major purpose of name related statutes is to provide an
easy means of identification. If a woman uses her maiden name
for all purposes, the function of such statutes is frustrated if she is
required to be identified by her husband's name. -
Confusion about the requirement that a married woman must
use her husband's surname inheres in the fact that this usage does
not effectively identify the husband. From the case law' 0 4 it is
quite clear that even if a woman's legal name includes her hus-
band's surname, her legal name consists of her first name and her
husband's last name. That is, if Jane Doe married John Roe, her
legal name would be Jane Roe, not Mrs. John Roe. While husband
and wife usually live in the same household (and, therefore, the
identification of Jane as "Roe" helps to identify John as her
husband), it is similarly possible that Jane and John Roe are sister
and brother, mother and son, or completely unrelated.
Arguments alleging administrative inconvenience to compel
women to use their husbands' surnames are equally untenable. In
fact, requiring all women to change their names at marriage im-
100 See part I B supra.
lot See part I B supra.
102 See, e.g., Lamber, supra note 17, at 779.
103 See part I B supra.
104 See, e.g., Koley v. Williams, 265 Mass. 601, 164 N.E. 444 (1929).
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poses an even greater burden on the state. If a woman's surname
is changed at marriage, she must alter all of her records, including
credit cards, voter registration, and automobile registration and
license. It would appear more sensible to have simply a space on
each document for the name of the spouse if his or her identi-
fication were essential; the task of destroying unnecessarily out-
dated records would be avoided.
This section will examine various areas that are affected by
name change laws and will demonstrate that the use by a woman
of her own surname will bring little change to existing procedures,
and may actually ameliorate others.
A. State Administrative Regulatory and Licensing
Schemes
1. Automobile Registration and Driver's Licenses-It will be
recalled that the court in Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry. stated in
dicta that a woman's legal name included her husband's surname
when a woman used her husband's name for all purposes except
her automobile registration. 10 5 Forbush v. Wallace later held that
under Alabama common law it was not unreasonable to require a
married woman to apply for her driver's license in her married
name despite the fact that she normally used her maiden name. 10 6
Automobile registration and driver's licenses have thus provided a
common source of litigation.
In Massachusetts, the automobile registration statute contains
the following language:
* . . The application shall contain, in addition to such other
particulars as may be required by the registrar, a statement of
the name, place of residence and address of the applicant....
The certificate [of registration] shall contain the name, place
of residence and address of the applicant and the register
number or mark, and shall be in such form and contain such
further information as the registrar may determine.10 7
The purpose of the statute has been variously found to be "to
afford easy means for the identification of motor vehicles and their
owners,'1 0 8 and "that the owner may be readily found by police
105 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926).
106 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 197 1), affld mem. 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
107 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 2 (1965, as amended 1969).
108 Matherson v. Dickson, 310 Mass. 18, 36 N.E.2d 382 (1941). Accord, Sanjean v.
Hyman, 302 Mass. 224, 19 N.E.2d 3 (1939); Lappanasse v. Loomis, 297 Mass. 290, 8
N.E.2d 766 (1937); Doyle v. Goldberg, 294 Mass. 105, 1 N.E.2d 1 (1936); Brodmerkle v.
Gorolsky, 293 Mass. 517, 200 N.E. 275 (1936).
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officers, injured persons and others interested, without uncertainty
or need for search."' 109
Yet the courts have permitted persons to receive automobile
registrations in a name other than that given at birth, even without
an order of the probate court making the name change "official."
The only condition imposed has been that the registrant be gener-
ally known by the name on the registration. As mentioned
above, 110 Theophilus Doucette was permitted to register his au-
tomobile under the name of Thomas Douey. 11 Ethel M. Williams
was similarly permitted to register her car under the name of Mrs.
John P. Williams since she was "better known" by that name
"and could easily be identified by such designation."" 2
If the purpose of the automobile registration is to enable third
parties to find a registrant without search, then such registration
should be in the name most commonly used by that registrant.
This purpose is defeated if a married woman using her maiden
name must register her automobile in her husband's name.
The driver's license statute in Massachusetts"13 provides, inter
alia, that a license shall contain the photograph and name of the
licensee, and that
.. every person licensed to operate motor vehicles as afore-
said shall endorse his usual signature on the margin of the
license, in the space provided for such purpose....
Although there is no case law regarding the purpose of the name
requirement on a license, presumably it is the same as that for
registration -to provide easy identification of the driver.. The re-
quirement that a photograph be affixed to the license eliminates
any confusion as to the recognition of the operator; furthermore,
the command that the license be endorsed with one's "usual
signature" enforces the idea that the license should be in the
driver's most frequently used name.
2. Voting-Because voting may appear to be more official
than other government regulated activities, it is not surprising that
many women who use their own surnames have great difficulty
in persuading registrars that they may register in those names." 4
109 Ricker v. Boston Elevated Ry., 290 Mass. 111, 194 N.E. 815 (1935).
110 See note 53 supra.
"' Bridges v. Hart, 302 Mass. 239, 18 N.E.2d 1020 (1939). Seenote 56supra.
112 Koley v. Williams, 265 Mass. 601, 164 N.E. 444 (1929). Cf. Fine v. Kahn, 270
Mass. 557, 170 N.E. 462 (1930); Korsun v. McManus, 318 Mass. 642, 63 N.E.2d 457
(1945).
113 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90 § 8 (1946).
114 See, e.g., notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
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Many election clerks believe that persons must register in their
"legal" names, and that a woman's legal name is that of her
husband, whether or not she uses it in her daily life. 115 The state
clearly has an interest in preventing voter fraud and in assuring
that a person votes only once. However, if a woman uses only
one name and has records in only one name, fraud is no more
likely than in other situations.
The voting scheme in Massachusetts is contained in Chapter 51
of the General Laws." 6 Every person who is eighteen or older,
who complies with the voting law, and who is a resident of the
town where he or she claims the right to vote, may have his or her
name entered on the voting list."1 7 Every January or February,
"police lists" are prepared, which contain the name, age, occupa-
tion, nationality, and residence of all persons over age seventeen
in each town." 8 In April, street lists are prepared from the police
lists and are distributed to all organized political committees and
candidates." 9 These lists include:
... the name, age or date of birth, occupation and nationality
if not a citizen of the United States, of every person listed
under § 4 [police lists], and his residence on January 1st of
the preceding year and of the current year. Every person so
listed, shall, if he is a registered voter, be so designated by an
asterisk or other symbol. 120
The election registrars record in the general register the list of all
qualified voters.' 2 '
They shall enter therein the name of every such voter written
in full, or instead thereof the surname and first Christian
name or that name by which he is generally known, written in
full and initial of every other name which he may have...
[emphasis added]. 122
Thus, there is no requirement that a voter be recorded on the
register in his or her "legal" name. Voter fraud can be prevented
by requiring a person to register in the name by which he or she is
generally known. Therefore, registrars are acting unjustifiably in
115 Goodman, supra note 69.
116 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51 (1973).
117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 1 (1971).
118 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 5 I, § 4 (1971).
119 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 6 (1973).
120 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 7 (1969).
121 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 37 (1973).
122 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 5 1, § 36 (1971).
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refusing to permit a married woman to register in her maiden
name if that is the name by which she is commonly known.
Furthermore, one could logically argue that many existing stat-
utory provisions permit a woman to register in her maiden name
unless her name is changed in fact by marriage. For example,
Section 2 of Chapter 51 of The General Laws provides:
If the name of a person who is duly registered as a voter is
changed by decree of court, or if a female, by marriage, his or
her right to vote in his or her former name shall continue until
January first next following .... 123
If a woman retains her maiden name after marriage, her name has
not changed by marriage; her right to vote in her maiden name
should therefore be unimpaired.
3. Licensing Boards-One of the major reasons for having
licensing boards is to protect the public from unskilled or un-
trustworthy practitioners. The board examines license applicants
and permits only those with proper qualifications to practice their
professions. To defend the public adequately, it is necessary that
the licensee be properly identified; the board must thus assure
that one does not receive a license in more than one name.
This standard, however, does not differ from the requirement of
the common law that one could assume a name only for a non-
fraudulent purpose.1 24 The board's obligation is satisfied by ensur-
ing that a person seeking a license receive it in the name that he or
she uses for all other transactions. There is no doubt that the
board should encourage or require licensees to use one name
only, but in the case of married women there is no reason why
that name should be their husbands'. The purpose of licensing is
defeated if a female licensee must be registered in a name which
she would not otherwise use professionally.
Most licensing boards have no regulations regarding name
changes; they just require that licensees be registered in their
"name." A few boards have, however, dealt specifically with the
problem. Typical of the latter group is the regulation of the
Massachusetts Board of Registered Dispensing Opticians:1 25
The Board shall issue a new registration certificate to any
licensee whose name has been legally changed upon receipt
123 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51. § 2 (1971).
124 See part I B supra.
125 Mass. Board of Registered Dispensing Opticians, Regulation of November 31. 1971.
See also Mass. Board of Registration of Dental Examiners, Regulation of October 25,
1944; Mass. Board of State Examiners of Electricians and Board of Electricians' Appeals,
Regulation of September 8, 1969, § 6.9.
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of satisfactory evidence of the legality of such change, the
return of the original certificate with satisfactory evidence
that he is the same person to whom the certificate was issued,
together with such fee as is required by law.
The issuance of the new certificate is predicated on sone action
by the licensee; that is, the surrender of the old license, evidence
of the change, and a request for a new license. If a female optician
did not change her name at marriage, she would not request a new
license. If her name did change, she would not get a new certifi-
cate unless she submitted to the Board a copy of her marriage
certificate. Although it would benefit the licensee to have the
certificate changed to the new name used by him or her, the
regulation of the Board ostensibly does not require this. It is clear,
therefore, that a requirement of name change after marriage would
cause unwarranted disruptions in the licensing scheme.
The Massachusetts Board of Registration in Nursing registers
more women than men. Their regulation also is relevant to a
married nurse's choice of name:
Name on original certificate. All original certificates issued
by the board shall bear the individual's legal name in full or
the first initial of each name. Unless the individual's name has
been changed legally, i.e., by marriage or decree, the board
will consider the name or names appearing on the birth certifi-
cate or other certified record of birth as the legal name....
Name on renewal certificate. Unless evidence of authoriza-
tion by court, notification of marriage, etc. has been sub-
mitted to the board, the renewal certificate will be issued
under the same name as the original certificate.' 26
If one accepts the holding of the Bacon case,' 2 7 the regulation
implies that married women must receive their original certificates
in their married names. However, the rule relating to a renewal
certificate would be meaningless if a female nurse could not get
her original license in her maiden name. Fortunately, the Board
has interpreted the regulation to allow a married woman using her
maiden name to receive her original certificate in that name.12 8 It
would perhaps be advisable for similar boards to provide in their
regulations that both the original and renewal certificates be is-
sued in the name by which the nurse is known professionally.
Once again, existing administrative operations would continue to
126 Regulation of July 30, 197 1.
127 Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry., 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926).
128 The author verified this by a telel-'--., call to the Board on February 28, 1974.
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function with at least equal efficiency were a name change or
surname retention right to be recognized.
B. Federal Administrative Regulations
Although the effectuation of women's name change rights must
be a state legal matter, 129 there will be a necessary in-
terrelationship with the federal bureaucracy. Four of the most
frequent areas of confrontation will be in the procurement of
savings bonds, social security cards, and passports, and in the
collection of the income tax.' 30 As with state administrative func-
tions, the recognition of a woman's right to retain her surname
after marriage, or to change back to her maiden name, can not
significantly affect the efficiency of these operations.
The issuance of savings bonds is regulated by the Code of
Federal Regulations l31 , which permits the bond to be in the
"name by which [the purchaser] is ordinarily known or the one
under which he does business." The regulation seems to accept
the common law concept of a name; 3 2 a married woman may be
the beneficiary of a bond issued in her maiden name if she has
generally used that name.
The Social Security Administration will not change the name
on a social security card unless the new name is formally reported
to the Administration. 3 3 An employer must enter on withholding
forms the employee's name and account number for tax and social
security purposes. 3 4 Therefore, no change of name can be forced
upon a married woman by her employer unless she chooses to
make the change herself. Information regarding the name to be
used in business and that which was given at birth are required on
the application forms, enabling those who wish to use one name
socially and one professionally to do so validly.
The same analysis applies to state and federal income tax
systems, for which the identifying notation is the social security
number.135 The number does not change with a change of name,
and no statute requires a woman to file returns in her married
name.
129 U.S. Const. amend. X.
130 Much of the information in this subsection is found in Bysiewicz & MacDonnell,
supra note 18, at 613-15.
'1a 31 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1973).
'32 See part I B supra.




Journal of Law Reform
The Code of Federal Regulations also governs the passport
procurement process. 136 There do not appear to be any official
rules preventing a married woman from obtaining a passport in
her maiden name, 137 although the formal language of the regu-
lation would imply that a change from maiden name to married
name at marriage would also require verification:
... any applicant who has changed his name by the adoption
of a new name without formal proceedings shall submit with
his application evidence that he has publicly and exclusively
used the adopted name over a long period of time.'13
C. Fraud on Creditors
Permitting a woman to use her maiden name after marriage
may elicit fears that fraud will be more easily perpetrated. How-
ever, from a creditor's standpoint, the problem is no greater than
that faced when any other individual changes his name at common
law.
Under common law rules, one could assume for business pur-
poses a name other than that given at birth, as long as the name
were not used fraudulently. 39 As the court in Petition of Merole-
Vitz' 40 stated, one can use an acquired name to make contracts, to
institute or defend law suits, and to take title to property.
Although no particular evidence suggests that married women
using their maiden names will be more likely than others to
perpetrate fraud, appropriate sanctions do remain in force. For
example, a common law action for damages for false pretenses
may be available to a creditor341 Statutory remedies exist as
well: 142
136 22 C.F.R. § 51.24 (1973).
137 This appears contrary to the implications of the letter reprinted in note 67 supra.
138 However, the author's call to the Boston branch of the Passport Office revealed the
following applicable rules: 1. If a woman has never had a passport, has married, and uses
her husband's surname, it is not necessary to submit a marriage license or proof of
marriage since the passport application asks for the name of one's spouse. 2. If a woman
has had a passport issued in her maiden name, married, and adopted her husband's sur-
name, it is necessary to furnish proof of the marriage. 3. If a woman has never had a
passport, married, and retains her maiden name, no proof other than the normal identi-
fication is required. 4. If a woman has had a passport in her married name and wishes to
change back to her maiden name, she must submit proof that she has used her maiden
name for at least a year. It is not necessary for her to submit affidavits to that effect;
charge cards or similar identification are sufficient.
139 See part I A supra.
140 320 Mass. 444, 448,450, 70 N.E.2d 249, 250 (1946). See note 24 and accompanying
text supra.
141 Commonwealth v. Warren, 6 Mass. 72 (1809).
142 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 37B (1955).
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§ 37B. Misuse of credit cards. Whoever, with intent to de-
fraud, (a) makes or causes to be made, either directly or
indirectly, any false statement as to a material fact in writing,
knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on,
respecting his identity or that of any other person, or his
financial condition or that of any other person, for the pur-
pose of procuring the issuance of a credit card . ..shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment
in a jail or house of correction for not more than one year, or
both.
One might need to know the identity of a husband only if the
husband were responsible for debts incurred by his wife. How-
ever, contracts made by a married woman relating to her separate
property (which includes her income) do not bind her husband. 1 43
Nor is a husband responsible for the tortious conduct of his
wife. 14 4 The only debts of the wife for which the husband is
responsible are "necessaries.' 14 When a merchant extends credit
to a married woman for such purchases, he need simply ask for
the name of her spouse; the wife need not use the same surname
as her husband if the latter's identity is made known to the
creditor. Furthermore, most credit card applications already re-
quire all applicants to supply the name of their spouses.' 46
If a wife were liable for the debts of her husband, then it might
be desirable to know the identity of each spouse. But under the
General Laws, 4 7 a married woman is not liable for the debts of
her husband except for necessaries (up to a value of $100) fur-
nished with her consent, if she has property worth more than
$2,000. Where a wife might be liable for certain debts of her
husband, a creditor need only require identification of the spouse.
As noted earlier, 148 identical surnames are not as good an index of
marital relationship as the positive identification of a spouse.
A further credit problem develops for a married woman if she
cannot use her own name in business and credit transactions. If
all credit is extended in her husband's name, it may be very
difficult for her to establish credit in her own right, even based
143 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 9 (1931).
144 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 6 (1963). Cf. McCarty v. DeBest, 120 Mass. 89
(1876); Austin v. Cox, 118 Mass. 58 (1875).
'45 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 7 (1963). "Necessaries" includes food and
clothing. Id.
146 See generally Littlefield, Sex-Based Discrimination and Credit Granting Practices, 5
CONN. L. REv. 575 (1973).
147 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, §7 (1963).
148 See notes 138 and 143 and accompanying text supra.
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upon her separate property. In addition, if a husband and wife
were to divorce and the wife to resume her maiden name, she
might be left entirely without credit although she had worked all
her life. 149
Centralized records are kept by the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth of all the information listed on Massachusetts mar-
riage certificates. 150 Since the record is filed under both the maid-
en name of the wife and the surname of the husband, creditors can
discover the identity of the husband of any woman married in
Massachusetts, regardless of the name she uses. Wherever joint
liability of husband and wife is a potential problem, identification
of the spouse prior to the extension of credit should give sufficient
protection to a creditor.
D. Property Transactions-
Interspousal Rights
It would be far easier to conduct a title search were married
women to retain their maiden names. 151 In Massachusetts, real
property records are kept by a system of grantor/grantee books.
The grantor index lists transactions in alphabetical order by the
name of the grantor, and the grantee index performs a like func-
tion according to the name of the grantee. If a single woman
receives property, the deed will record her name as grantee in her
maiden name; if she marries and uses her husband's name, it is
likely that as grantor of the property, the deed will list her in her
married name. As a result, title searches may disclose an apparent
gap in the holding of a parcel of property. One commentator has
suggested that all "honest" grantees will indicate on a deed the
maiden name of a married female grantor. i5 2
Problems may arise even if a woman retains her maiden name,
because tax assessments and liens may still be indexed under her
husband's name. Property in which the grantor is listed as Alice
Smith may have all incumbrances indexed under John R. Jones. 153
Spousal recognition will be difficult unless John R. Jones is speci-
149 Material prepared by Steven Patt for the Women's Lobby concerning the negative
Judicial Council Report on H. 3364.
150 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 46, § 17 (1960).
151 Author's discussion with Ms. Audrey lngber, a professional title examiner in New
York.
152 Johnson, Title Examination in Massachusetts, in A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES
AND TEXT ON PROPERTY, 886, 913 (2d ed. 1969).
153 Id. at 889.
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fically identified as the husband of Alice Smith, whether or not
both share a common surname.
Another type of problem arises when husband and wife are
presumed to take property as tenants by the entirety rather than
as joint tenants when a conveyance is made to them jointly. 154
In joint tenancy, each tenant takes an undivided share in the
property; a right of survivorship vests in the surviving tenant(s).
However, the survivorship feature can be defeated if any joint
tenant conveys his or her interest to a third party.155 Thus, if X
and Y owned property as joint tenants, and no conveyance to a
third party were made, at the death of X, Y would own the entire
parcel outright. However, if X conveyed his interest to Z during
the former's lifetime, on the death of X, Y would have only an
undivided one-half interest in the property.
A tenancy by the entirety is limited to ownership of property
by husband and wife. As with the joint tenancy, each partner
takes an undivided share in the property. However, barring termi-
nation of the marriage by divorce or annulment, the right of
survivorship here is indestructible. 156 Thus, if the foregoing trans-
action were conducted in regard to a tenancy by the entirety, the
conveyance to Z would be void, and Y would still be entitled to
the entire parcel on the death of X.
Consequently, if a conveyance to a husband and wife jointly
were to create a tenancy by the entirety rather than a joint
tenancy, serious problems could arise if a woman used her maiden
name after marriage. Third parties would have no notice of a
tenancy by the entirety unless the parties were identified as hus-
band and wife in the deed. To prevent such confusion, some
statutes create a presumption that husband and wife take property
as joint tenants; in order to create a tenancy by the entirety, the
words "tenancy by the entirety" must be used explicitly. 157 Of
course, if the relevant words are used, this gives sufficient notice
to third parties that a tenancy by the entirety has been created,
regardless of the surnames of the spouses.
At the death of one of the spouses, it may be necessary to
prove the marital relationship. On intestacy, the wife or husband
will need to be positively identified to assert his or her rights; if a
154 For the analysis in this section see generally A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note
144, at 281-83.
155 A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 144, at 282.
156 Id. at 283.
157 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §7 (1954, as amended 1973).
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will or trust instrument does not identify the spouse beneficiary by
name, identification problems also may arise. However, there
should be no difficulty in proving the identity of a spouse with a
different surname than the decedent, since the marriage certificate
will include the birth-given names of each spouse.
A different problem arises with respect to dower and curtesy
rights. If the husband and wife have different surnames, it may be
more difficult for potential or actual bona fide purchasers of prop-
erty to ascertain whether a spouse exists. Yet, at least as to
marriages performed in Massachusetts, records are available in
the Secretary of the Commonwealth's office to determine whether
a marital relationship exists. Further documentation is ensured by
the fact that many banks will not accept mortgages unless the
grantor's spouse joins in the deed.
In addition, many states have substantially limited dower and
curtesy rights.' 58 In Massachusetts, such rights are now limited to
only a one-third life interest in property of which the decedent
spouse was seised at the time of death. 159 Even intestacy gives a
spouse a minimum of a one-third outright interest in the proper-
ty. 160 Furthermore, a husband or wife cannot claim curtesy or
dower unless the will is renounced or the will explicitly provides
to the contrary. 16 Therefore, only in a very few cases will a
spouse elect to take dower or curtesy.
Potential conflicts in community property states may similarly
be resolved in favor of allowing a woman to use her maiden name.
As the following analysis will demonstrate, a purchaser of proper-
ty should not be prejudiced by such a practice if a woman proper-
ly records her ownership in her maiden name.
If property is held by a married couple sharing a common
surname, a bona fide purchaser would be held to have notice that
the property was community property. A purchaser should sim-
ilarly be held to a duty of inquiry regarding the true state of
ownership of property held by two persons who do not share a
common surname. Furthermore, if property is recorded only in
the name of one spouse, the difficulties encountered in a title
search would be no greater than if the deed were recorded solely
in the name of a married woman who uses her husband's surname.
The state of California has mitigated the problem somewhat by
15
a See E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 75 (2d ed. 1973).
159 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 189. § I (1965).
160 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 1 (193 1).
161 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 17 (1931).
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creating a statutory presumption designed to expedite the process
of verifying joint title. A married woman taking property pursuant
to a written instrument takes the property separately if the deed
contains her name alone.162
Regardless of the nature of the property rights in any given
state, the unrestricted use by married women of their maiden
names would create no additional hardship. Once again, any as-
sertion of administrative burden in opposition to granting such a
right stands weakly before the realities of the situation.
E. Children
One of the most difficult assertions to dispute is that the use by
married women of names different from those of their spouses and
children will inevitably hasten the deterioration of family life.
However, with higher divorce rates163 it is no longer unusual for
remarried parents and their children to have different surnames.
In addition, it is not uncommon for a child to use a different
surname from his mother's when the latter has custody after
divorce. 164 A remarriage by a parent does not automatically
change the name of the child; even an adoption does not confer a
new name on a child unless such change is requested and the
court, in its discretion, grants the petition. 16 5 Furthermore, if an
individual seeks to change his or her name by petition to the
probate court, 166 it is unnecessary for the spouse and the children
of the petitioner to be included in the petition. If a person changes
his or her name by repute at common law, the names of his or her
spouse and offspring do not change unless they, too, develop new
reputations.
If there is an agreement between husband and wife, all children
in the family may not legally be required to receive their father's
name; it is possible also for children to share their mother's
surname. 16 7 This may strengthen family ties by demonstrating to
the children that their parents are equal partners in a marital
relationship. One may conclude that because little empirical data
162 CAL, CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1969).
163 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 38 (1973).
164 Hughes, And Then There Were Two, in Symposium- Women's Rights,23 HASTINGS
L.J. 233. 244 (1971).
165 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210. § 6 (1971).
'6 Under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210. § 6 (1971).
167 73/74-29 MASS. OP. ATT'Y GEN. (1974).
FALL 19741
Journal of Law Reform
exists, the familial effects of having parents who use different
surnames remain unclear.
It is also argued that differences between children's surnames
and those of their fathers imply illegitimacy. 168 However, if it
becomes difficult to ascertain whether a child is a bastard merely
by comparing the surnames of father and child, the opposite effect
may result: the stigma of illegitimacy may diminish.
As previously mentioned, 169 at least one attorney general has
concluded that if a married woman has "changed" her name to
her maiden name by petition to the probate court, she and her
husband may give the child her surname.170 The Massachusetts
Attorney General reasoned that no statute required a legitimate
child to take on its father's surname.1 71 Since a married woman
could use a name different from her husband's through the mecha-
nism of the probate court petition, the state demonstrated no
strong interest in requiring families to share a surname.1 72 Courts
have held that even a child may acquire a new name; the right to
name a baby is relegated to its parents.1 73 Although the Attorney
General did not reach the question of whether the same analysis
applied to a woman who simply retains her maiden name, there is
no significant distinction.
A different problem is raised when parents who do not share a
surname disagree about the surname of their legitimate child.
Massachusetts courts have approached the problem only in cases
of divorce, where the parents do not share a household. In Mark
v. Kahn,1 74 an equity proceeding was brought by the father to
enjoin his former wife and her current husband from registering
his children in school under the surname of the mother's current
husband. While the court recognized that at common law one
could change one's name at will,' 75 it was unwilling to concede
that a parent could force on a child a name different from that by
which the child had always been known.' 76 The court would
determine whether a child should be obliged to change his sur-
name according to the best interest of the child and the degree of
estrangement of the child from the complaining father. 177 The
168 See, e.g., U. STANNARD, supra note 69, at 48.
169 See note 17 supra.
170 73/74-29 MASS. Op. ATT'Y GEN. (1974).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See Lamber, supra note 17, at 805.
174 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956).
175 333 Mass. at 520, 131 N.E.2d at 761.
176 333 Mass. at 520-521, 131 N.E.2d at 761-62.
177 333 Mass. at 521-22, 131 N.E.2d at 760.
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court implied that to allow the children to assume a name other
than their father's would, in this instance, weaken an already
tenuous relationship. Therefore, the injunction was granted.
Similarly, in Margolis v. Margolis,17 8 the court enjoined the
school registration of children of divorced parents under their
mother's maiden name. The trial judge found that to use that
name would adversely affect the father's relationship with his
children.
It is not clear what courts would do where parents are not
divorced and where the child has not already acquired his or her
father's name by repute. One author has suggested that the courts
have maintained the right of the father to name his children on the
basis of a "head of household" test or because he has the duty to
support his children. 179 Consequently, when courts realize that
women may equally contribute to the economic support of the
family, the father's exclusive right to name his children will vanish
accordingly:
Where, then, does this leave the mother who wishes to give
her children her own surname or a hyphenated surname com-
posed of her name and her husband's name? The laws will
undoubtedly follow the changed status of women. Gradually,
the term 'Head of the Family' has meaning only in a divorce
proceeding in which a wife is seeking support from the hus-
band. If a woman contracts a marriage on an equal standing
with her husband, and she supports her children, she can
name her children anything she wishes on a mutual agreement
and she can maintain equal control in the family. However,
this equal status is incompatible with financial dependency of
the wife. 180
It should be noted that the above premise is predicated upon
mutual agreement. Should a parent object to the use of someone
else's surname for the child, it would be appropriate for the courts
to use a Mark v. Kahn'8 ' test, and decide each case on its facts.
F. Conflict of Laws 18 2
The law of name change raises some interesting but as yet
178 338 Mass. 416. 155 N.E.2d 177 (1959).
179 See Carlsson. supra note 4.
1so Id. at 568.
181 See note 175 and accompanying text supra.
182 The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Donald Trautman of the
Harvard Law School for his help with this section.
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unresolved issues on conflict of laws. If a woman in Massachu-
setts has the right to change or to retain her maiden name, does
that right remain intact when she moves to another state? The
question arises in three name change situations: (a) where a wom-
an changes her name by decree in probate court; (b) where a
woman retains her maiden name at common law; and (c) where a
woman asserts her own surname on the basis of a statute.' 83
If a woman has her name changed to her maiden name by
decree of a probate court in one state, that decree should be
honored in other states.184 If other states claim an overwhelming
interest in the use by married women of their husbands' surnames,
they might prevail, but it would be difficult to establish a valid
state interest in this field. 18 5 Rather, a probate court decree on
name change should be treated like a probate court decree of
adoption. Under normal conflict principles, the status of a person
as an adopted child is decided under the law of the state rendering
the adoption decree.' 8 6 Analogously, if under the law of one state
a probate court confers a name on a person, the legality of the
name should be determined with reference to that state's law.
A woman who uses her maiden name under her common law
right' 8 7 and who then moves to a state which requires by statute
or regulation that a woman use her husband's surname, would
probably lose her right to use her own surname. This was the
situation in Forbush v. Wallace,8 8 which remains applicable to
the conflicts issue.189 Wendy Forbush retained her maiden name
after marriage under Maryland common law, and she moved to
Alabama. That state required her to receive her driver's license in
her husband's name, and the Supreme Court upheld Alabama's
right to do so. 190
Surname retention pursuant to a statutory provision might be
analogized to legitimization. Both are statutory procedures, and
both involve the granting of a status in one state which must be
183 An example would be a statute patterned after S. 197. See note 90 and accom-
panying text supra.
184 U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § I.
185 See parts V A and V B supra.
186 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 (1971).
187 See part I B supra.
188 It should be recalled that the Forbush decision is of questionable precedential value
due to Ms. Forbush's concession of the common law rule. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F.
Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd mem. 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
189 See notes 33-42 and accompanying text supra.
190 However, a court applying the principles enunciated in Stuart v. Board of Election
might reach a contrary result. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
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given effect in another state. 19 1 Furthermore, in both cases the
state in which the person is domiciled frequently has a greater
interest in the status of the individual than the state where the
initial act took place. Yet the Restatement of Conflict of Laws
states that:
§ 287. (1) Whether a child is legitimate is determined by the
local law of the state which, with respect to the particular
issue, has the most significant relationship to the child and the
parent under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) The child will usually be held legitimate if this would be
his status under the local law of the state where either (a) the
parent was domiciled when the child's status of legitimacy is
claimed to have been created or (b) the child was domiciled
when the parent acknowledged the child as his own.192
The comment to this section explains that:
A status of legitimacy once created under the principles
stated in the rule of this section will usually be recognized in
another state even with respect to an issue, such as in-
heritance, in the determination of which the other state has
the dominant interest.193
Presumably, even under these conflicts principles, a state could
invalidate another state's legitimization if the former state's pub-
lic policy against a particular legitimization were overwhelming.
However, an interpretation of the conflicts principles of legitimi-
zation suggests that a statutory name change should be accepted
in the new state.
VI. CONCLUSION
While an increasing number of married women have begun to
assert their own surnames, opposition to recognition of the right
continues to cause unnecessary bureaucratic and social con-
frontations. Refusals to permit the use of maiden names are often
justified by a misplaced reliance upon the notion that a woman's
legal name includes her husband's surname. According to the
common law, however, a legal name is simply the name by which
a person is generally known. Thus, although it has been customa-
ry for married women to adopt their husbands' surnames, no legal
191 See note 182 supra.
192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 287 (197 1).
193 Id., Comments to subsection (2) at 257.
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rule establishes a prohibition against women retaining or reas-
serting their maiden names.
The additional bureaucratic burdens that would allegedly ac-
company the right to retain or reacquire maiden names do not, in
fact, exist. The problems encountered in processing the multitude
of women who automatically change their surnames at marriage
are perhaps even greater at present than they would be were
women unquestionably permitted to retain their own surnames.
Furthermore, doubts concerning property transactions and pos-
sible creditor fraud can be resolved by requiring adequate spousal
identification and by enforcing existing anti-fraud sanctions.
The potential avenues of legal recourse are varied, although the
most preferable solution remains universal recognition of the com-
mon law right to retain one's own surname. In view of the obsti-
nance of many low-level bureaucrats, however, a statutory route
might also be effectively followed. Regardless of which path is
chosen, it is imperative that existing discrimination-which con-
stitutes a denial of equal protection to women- be eliminated.
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